AN OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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Most occupational choice models introduce only two options for agents: entrepreneurial activities or wage-employment. However, these models represent inadequately the labor force distribution from developing countries, where an important proportion of the total work force are self-employed workers. Some models introduce self-employment as an occupational choice. These works have a common feature: when in equilibrium, wage earners belong to the lower end of the income distribution. Nevertheless, for a large set of developing countries, peasants and small proprietors are part of a self-employment sector that can mostly be found in the lower end of the income distribution. In contrast with previous efforts, in this work self-employment formation is consistent with data from most developing countries. We pay special attention to the conditions under which either the economy ends in a low income equilibrium where self-employment is the only form of production, or alternatively, the economy ends in a high income equilibrium with a well developed labor market. We study some public policy issues, paying special attention to role of capital markets and the efficiency of schooling.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Traditional general equilibrium models in economics consider only one occupational choice: workers. Firms are simply anonymous entities for whom agents work for a salary. Nevertheless, there have been some efforts which try to build models with a

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richer set of occupational choices. Lucas’s work (1978) is one of the most representative early efforts in this direction: he builds a model where agents, depending on their entrepreneurial abilities, choose between being entrepreneurs or workers. In a different type of model, developed by Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), agents differ on their level of risk aversion: agents with low risk aversion will choose entrepreneurial activities. However, these representations of the occupational choices of agents are probably adequate for developed countries, where most agents are either entrepreneurs or workers. Nonetheless, these models are an inadequate way of representing the labor force distribution from less developed countries, where an important proportion of the population are self-employed workers.\footnote{For a group of African countries, Mead and Liedhold (1998) report that workers in some form of self-employment double the amount of agents engaged in wage employment; furthermore, a work by Galli and Kucera (2003) for 14 Latin American countries reports that in 1997 the average relative size of self-employment was 27%, with a three points increase in only seven years. Furthermore, a work by Mezal (1998) presents data for Mexico where 62% of individuals without schooling have self-employment as its occupational choice.} Any research work whose main purpose is to analyze and comprehend the main economic and social problems faced by the poorest people in developing countries must include self-employment formation.

Banerjee and Newman (1993) built a model where self-employment is an occupational choice and the decisions are based on an initial wealth distribution. Because of the existence of a collateral, rich individuals can receive a loan in order to become high-scale entrepreneurs, while agents located in the middle of the initial wealth distribution receive smaller loans which allow them to enter self-employment with a low-scale production process. On the other hand, without a high enough collateral, agents in the lower end of the wealth distribution can only join wage-employment. However, it is important to notice that, in developing countries, an important proportion of agents that have self-employment as their occupational choice depend on economic activities that provide only a subsistence level of income and are poorer than wage earners. Furthermore, some empirical studies show that besides being an important and growing sector in some developing countries, self employment can be found mostly in the lower end of the income distribution.\footnote{On a meta-analysis that includes several empirical studies, Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg (2003) point out that there is great consistency between studies that find that education lowers the likelihood of self-employment in developing countries, with more educated agents ending up in wage employment.} Therefore, it seems that the model developed by Banerjee and Newman (1993) does not accommodate these stylized facts for developing countries.

More models that attempt to study self-employment dynamics have been developed. For example, Antunes and Cavalcanti (2002) build a general equilibrium model where agents are differentiated by their entrepreneurial ability (as in Lucas (1978)); however, as in Banerjee and Newman (1993), wage earners belong to the lower end of the income
distribution.

Our work is an effort to build a model that rationalizes empirical observations for developing countries where wage earners’ income is higher than that of agents in self-employment. We build a general equilibrium model where the occupational choice decision is endogenous to the model and, as in Lucas (1978), the amount of human capital plays a decisive role. On a key assumption of our model, we introduce two production functions, one that uses high skill labor and, alternatively, a self-employment production process that requires only low skill labor. All agents have access to both technologies. On a second key assumption, we introduce a labor market for high skill workers. In our model, agents will optimally choose between entrepreneurial activities or wage-employment. At equilibrium, we will show that (probably not very far from reality) some well educated agents will not become high-skilled entrepreneurs since this occupation provides a low income at their skill level; however, since their skill level is high enough to receive an attractive income as a worker, they will choose to enter the labor market and will turn down the option for running a self-employment firm that uses a low skill production technology. Therefore, in our model, wage earners have a higher income than agents in self-employment; this result is consistent with observations from developing countries.

Empirical studies argue that improved managerial ability has a positive impact on entrepreneurial activities since it enhances the expected income from these activities. However, this channel also moves in the opposite direction, where schooling has a negative impact on entrepreneurial activities since agents leave self-employment and move to wage-employment (see Lee (1999), Blau (1985), and Vanpraag and Cramer (2001)). Our model supports these observations: at low levels of human capital, an improvement in schooling attainments produces a transition from self-employment toward wage-employment, while at high levels of human capital, improved education creates a migration from wage-employment favoring entrepreneurial activities.

Looking into empirical data, we see that still an important percentage of low human capital agents choose to be poorly paid workers, even if the average income from self-employment is higher. Probably the lack of initial wealth (as in Banerjee and Newman (1993)) or risk aversion (as in Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979)) helps to explain this fact. It seems that the complete story is a combination of three explanatory variables: human capital, risk aversion and initial wealth. However, besides the technical difficulties of introducing to the model a joint distribution function, this work will concentrate on human capital because of two additional reasons: it is easier to collect data relating income with years of schooling in order to make empirical testing of the model, and secondly, empirical findings (see Van der Sluis, Van Praag, and Vijverberg (2003), and Vanpraag and Cramer (2001)) show that education is the crucial variable in occupational choice decisions, entrepreneurship selection and entrepreneurial success in developing countries.

For reasons later explained, in contrast to previous efforts, our model is static. In the Banerjee and Newman (1993) paper, where the model is dynamic, they pay special
attention to the initial conditions under which the economy either converges to a modern economy with a well-developed labor market, or one where self-employment is the only form of production. In our case, we study conditions where the only equilibrium is either self-employment or a modern economy with entrepreneurs and wage earners. We lack an analysis of convergence; nevertheless, our simpler setup allows for a broader analysis of policy issues.

A crucial issue that Banerjee and Newman (1993) want to address is why some countries become economies with entrepreneurs employing workers in large factories, while other countries remain represented mainly by small proprietors and peasants. Unfortunately, in the model they build, the size of business firms is exogenous to the model. Therefore, they cannot study the conditions under which the economy is represented by small or large firms. In our work, where the size of business firms is endogenous to the model, we overcome this problem.

This paper will address the relationship between per capita income and the relative size of the self-employment sector. We prove that this relationship is not necessarily negative: we build economies where policies that increase the relative size of the self-employment sector can also produce a higher per capita income. Additionally, this work will address some policy issues, paying special attention to the presence of borrowing constraints and the efficiency of schooling.

2. AN ECONOMY WITH SELF-EMPLOYMENT

Is the lack of job opportunities what pushes agents into self-employment? For example, Harris and Todaro (1969) argue that workers might temporarily be forced to join low productive activities, where scarcity of jobs and costly job search are in good part responsible. The answer to this question is extremely important for our purposes. If the existence of self-employment is explained by a lack of opportunities, then a disequilibrium model or one with labor market rigidities could be most appropriate to study self-employment dynamics (instead of using a general equilibrium setup). However, recent empirical findings suggest that self-employment selection is a decision based on income maximization rather than the result of lack of employment opportunities (see Van der Sluis, Van Praag, and Vijverberg (2003), Psacharopoulos (1994), and Maloney (1999)). Therefore, it seems adequate to choose a rational choice type model in order to address the occupational choice issues from developing economies.

Our economy has a continuum of agents which are identified by their educational level. More precisely,

\[ i \in [0,1], \]

where \( i^* = 1 \) represents the individual with the highest schooling attainment. We chose
to build a model where the level of human capital is an exogenous variable because of two main reasons: first of all, to introduce dynamic decisions will greatly complicate the model, and secondly, an exogenous human capital distribution will allow us to analyze several public policy alternatives.

Agents can perform two types of activities: low-skill and high-skill. These abilities can be used either in entrepreneurial activities or wage-employment. We introduce a function \( h(i) \) that transforms schooling into low-skill productivity. Probably not far from reality, we assume that low-skill productivity is independent from schooling and that all agents are equally capable of performing low-skill activities, that is

\[
h(i) = h \text{ for all } i.
\]

We now introduce the function \( H(i) \), which represents the productivity level-while performing a high skill occupation-of an agent with schooling level \( i \). Probably not far away from reality, all agents are born with a given level of high-skill productivity that can be improved with more years of schooling. That is, we assume that \( H(0) > 0 \) and that \( H'(i) > 0 \) for all \( i \geq 0 \). For a wage, agents can offer their low or high-skill abilities to the market.

Our economy has two types of production technologies. The first one requires low-skill labor, and is represented by

\[
Q(h, K) = \min\{K, h\}.
\]

That is, an agent that decides to be a low-skill technology entrepreneur contributes with \( h \) units of low skill labor\(^4\), and chooses the amount of capital \( K \) that maximizes his income as a low-skill entrepreneur (LSE). That is,

\[
I_h(i) = \min\{K, h\} - rK,
\]

where \( r \) represents the rental price of capital, which is an exogenous variable to the model (the following section will further discuss this assumption). In order to have a well defined maximization problem, we introduce an exogenous borrowing constraint: the maximum amount of capital to borrow for a LSE is \( \bar{k} \).\(^5\) Furthermore, in order to

\(^3\) In order to simplify the presentation, we adopt a Leontieff technology; nevertheless, most of the results of the paper remain unchanged introducing instead a Cobb-Douglas production function.

\(^4\) We assume that agents that choose to be a low-skill entrepreneur provide the labor for production and are not allowed to hire other low skill workers. This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis and allows us to concentrate in the study of self-employment formation.

\(^5\) Other works also assume the existence of market imperfections and introduce borrowing constraints. For
capture a fact from most developing countries (e.g., shortage of capital relative to labor), we assume that $\bar{k} < h$; therefore, income is represented by

$$I_h(i) = \bar{k}(1 - r).$$

As we mentioned before, there is an alternative production technology, one that uses high-skill workers. An agent $i$ that decides to operate a high-skill firm, requires $K$ units of capital, provides $H(i)$ units of administrative work, and hires $l_{Hi}$ units of high skill (HS) labor. The production technology is represented by

$$Q(H(i), K, l_{Hi}) = \min\{KH(i), l_{Hi}\}.$$

Therefore, the income of an agent $i$ that decides to become a high-skill entrepreneur (HSE) is

$$I_{Hi}(i) = \min\{KH(i), l_{Hi}\} - w_{Hi}l_{Hi} - rK.$$  

An important difference between the HS and the LS technologies is that the HS technology requires two types of high-skill workers: HS labor and an administrator of capital (a high-skill occupation that is performed by the owner of the firm). Additionally, in order to simplify matters, notice that we have assumed that there is no market for administrators, which means that a high-skill entrepreneur (HSE) can only use his/her high skill abilities in order to fulfill this activity. We know that a HSE will optimally choose $l_{Hi} = \bar{K}H(i)$, therefore

$$I_{Hi}(i) = \bar{K}[H(i) - w_{Hi}H(i) - r].$$

Notice that, since $H(i)$ is increasing in $i$, a highly educated agent will be a better administrator and will optimally hire more labor than a less capable one (i.e., a bigger firm size). As in the low-skill (LS) technology case, in order to have a well defined maximization problem, we introduce a borrowing constraint where $\bar{K}$ represents the amount of collateral.

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On a following section, this assumption will allow us to study the average size of business firms; in the work by Banerjee and Newman (1996), this can not be done since the firm size is exogenous to the model: a larger modern sector can only be represented with an increase in the number of identical firms.
constraint for a HSE. Notice that the rental price of capital is the same whether you borrow for a high or a low-skill firm. This reflects that the probability of default is the same one in both capital markets.

To assume that the HS technology uses HS labor (and not LS labor) is central to the results of this work since it introduces a labor market for HS labor that opens additional occupational choices for highly educated agents. As will be explained in the following section, this assumption will allow us to have a group of middle income agents that work for a salary and that are richer than agents in self-employment.

Wrapping up, low skills can only be used in self-employment activities, while high-skill labor can be used either in HS entrepreneurial activities or in wage-employment. That is, there are only three occupational choices, where the set $O = \{h, W, H\}$ represents these choices.\(^8\) Equations 2 and 3 represent the income for HSE and LSE respectively, while the income for a HS worker is represented by

$$I_H(i) = wH(i).$$

Figure 1 draws the income functions for these occupational choices. Notice that all agents that satisfy $H(i) < H_1$ will choose LSE activities, while agents that satisfy $H_1 < H(i) < H_2$ will prefer to join the labor market for high skills, and any agent $i$ that satisfies $H(i) > H_2$ will choose to run a firm that hires high-skill workers (i.e., they will become high skill entrepreneurs). The figure is drawn without paying attention to the exogenous and endogenous parameters of the economy. As a matter of fact, later on we prove that at equilibrium, under specific values for the exogenous parameters of the model, it could be the case that no agents chooses to be a LSE, and under a different set of parameters, there is a unique equilibrium where all agents choose self-employment activities.

Bear in mind that the income for self-employment activities does not increase with schooling. However, empirical evidence does not support this assumption. Results from Van der Sluis, Van Praag and Vijverberg (2003) and Psacharopoulos (1994) show that one year of schooling raises self-employment income by an average 5%. Additionally, these studies show that the returns from schooling are higher for wage-employment (close to 10%), which are facts that our model supports (i.e., lower returns for agents in self-employment).

\(^8\) Notice that the set of occupational choices set $O = \{h, W, H\}$ lacks the $i$ subscript, meaning that all agents face the same set of choices. As an alternative, we could have introduced a constraint where only agents that have a minimum level of schooling have access to entrepreneurial activities (e.g., because they need a license to operate or the lack of access to credit markets). This work will not follow this line of research.
The occupational choice problem for agent $i$ is straightforward,

$$C(i) = \{n \in O: I_n(i) \geq I_m(i) \text{ for all } m \in O\}.$$  

That is, an agent will choose the occupation that provides the highest income. Notice that if two occupations generate the same income to agent $i$, both will be included in the choice set. The set of agents that select occupational choice $n$ is represented by

$$\theta_n(\xi, w) = \{i \in [0,1]: n \in C(i)\},$$

where the wage rate $w$ is an endogenous variable and $\xi = \{K, \bar{K}, r, H(i)\}$ represents the set of exogenous parameters of the model. The main objective of this work is to study the properties of the occupational sets $\theta_n(\xi, w)$. Needless to say, changes in the values of $K, \bar{K}, H(i), r$ and $w$ will modify the income functions for each occupation, hence it will have an impact on the $\theta_n(\xi)$ sets. In order to simplify notation, unless otherwise indicated, $\theta_n$ will represent the occupational set $\theta_n(\xi, w)$. We can prove an important property of the occupational sets (the proof is left for the appendix):

\textit{Lemma 1.} $\theta_n$ is a convex set for all $n = h, H, W$.

The following proposition presents one of the main results of this paper (the proof is
left for the appendix):

**Proposition 1.** If \( i \in \theta_n \) and \( i^* \in \theta_w \) then \( i \leq i^* \) and \( I_h(i) \leq I_w(i^*) \).

That is, agents that choose self-employment over wage-employment have a lower educational level and a lower income level. Therefore, the structure of the model seems to rationalize recent empirical findings for developing countries. The following proposition will help us to fully characterize our main hypothesis,

**Proposition 2.** If \( i \in \theta_w \) and \( i^* \in \theta_H \) then \( i \leq i^* \) and \( I_w(i) \leq I_H(i^*) \).

Therefore, high-skill entrepreneurs have the highest schooling level and are the richest group in the economy. The rest of this paper will study the properties of our economy at equilibrium. In order to do this, we first need to introduce an equilibrium concept.

3. EQUILIBRIUM

In order to characterize the demand and supply for labor, some notation needs to be introduced. We need to specify the agents with the lowest and highest educational levels that choose a specific occupation: let \( \inf(\theta_n) \) represent the worker with the lowest human capital that chooses occupation \( n \). Similarly, let \( \sup(\theta_n) \) be the agent from set \( \theta_n \) that has the highest human capital. We can easily see that (the proof is left for the appendix):

**Proposition 3.** If \( \theta_n \) are not empty sets then i) \( \inf(\theta_n) = 0 \), ii) \( \sup(\theta_H) = 1 \), iii) \( \sup(\theta_h) = \inf(\theta_w) \), and iv) \( \sup(\theta_w) = \inf(\theta_H) \).

We are ready to define the demand for labor. First, recall that the demand for high-skill labor from agent \( i \) is \( l_H = KH(i) \); therefore, the aggregate demand for labor is

\[
\mathcal{L}^d(\xi^*) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta_H = \emptyset, \\
\frac{1}{K} \int_{\inf(\theta_w)}^{\sup(\theta_h)} H(i) \, di & \text{if } \theta_H \neq \emptyset.
\end{cases}
\]

And the aggregate labor supply is
Notice that the convexity of $\theta_n$ is crucial in order to have a well defined demand and supply for labor. We now present the equilibrium concept for this economy where, as it is done in most general equilibrium models, we first introduce an arbitrary occupational distribution vector, then we ask if there is a wage rate such that all agents choose voluntarily the occupational choice assigned to them and if the labor market is at equilibrium. More precisely,

**Definition 1 (Occupational Equilibrium Vector).** Let \( \{ X_h, X_W, X_H \} \) be an array of three subsets of \([0,1]\) such that \( X_W \cup X_h \cup X_H = [0,1] \). For given values of \( k, \bar{k} \) and \( r \) we say that \( X \) is an Occupational Equilibrium Vector (OEV) if there is a wage rate \( \hat{w} \) such that i) \( \theta_n \subseteq \theta_n(\xi, \hat{w}) \) for all \( n \in O \) (Occupational Choice) and ii) \( \xi_i(\hat{w}) = \xi_d(\hat{w}) \) (Labor Market Equilibrium).

Notice that our definition for Occupational Equilibrium Vector (OEV) lacks an equilibrium condition for the capital market: we could think that our economy is a small country that faces an exogenous interest rate and a perfectly elastic supply for capital. This assumption is also found in Banerjee and Newman (1996), where they assumed that financial claims are mediated by foreign banks that lend at a fixed interest rate. This assumption will allow us later on to make some comparative statics concerning changes in interest rates and borrowing constraints.

In order to characterize the equilibrium for this economy, we need to introduce a specific representation for \( H(i) \). However, assuming that an equilibrium exists, we can study some important properties of an OEV.

### 4. CORNER SOLUTIONS

Assume that at a given wage rate \( w^* \) the income as a worker of the most educated agent (i.e., \( w^* H(1) \)) is equal to its income as a LSE (i.e., \( w^* H(1) = \bar{k}(1-r) \)). If this is the case, since \( H(i) \) is decreasing in \( i \), every agent with a human capital lower than 1 will decide to become a LSE since this occupation provides a higher return; furthermore, at a wage rate higher than \( w^* \), not even agent \( i = 1 \) will choose to be a worker. That is, since at a wage rate lower than \( w^* = \bar{k}(1-r)/H(1) \) no agent chooses wage employment, we have
Lemma 2. If \( \theta_w \neq \phi \) then \( w \geq A_1 \),

where \( A_1 = \frac{k(1-r)}{H(1)} \). That is, the previous lemma presents necessary conditions for the existence of an OEV where the set of agents that have wage-employment as its occupational choice is a not empty set.

Similarly, assume that at the wage rate \( w^* \) the income as a worker of the most educated agent is equal to its income as a HSE. That is,

\[
\overline{K}[H(1)(1-w^*)-r] = w^*H(1).
\]

If this is the case, as figure 2 shows, every agent with a human capital lower than 1 will not choose to be a HSE since becoming a worker provides a higher return. Solving for \( w^* \) we obtain,

\[
w^* = \frac{\overline{K}}{1+\overline{K}} \left[ 1-\frac{r}{H(1)} \right] = A_2.
\]

Therefore, since \( I_W \) is increasing in \( w \) (i.e., it shifts upwards in figure 2) and \( I_H \) is
decreasing in \( w \) (i.e., it shifts downwards), at any wage rate higher than \( w^* \) no agent in the economy chooses HSE as an occupational activity. Therefore,

**Lemma 3.** If \( \Theta_H \) is not an empty set then \( w \leq A_2 \).

Therefore, Lemmas 2 and 3 provide two necessary conditions for the existence an OEV with high-skill workers and HSE (i.e., the existence of a modern sector). However, this is not a strong result since the wage rate \( w \) is an endogenous variable of the model. However, it is possible to find conditions under which one of the necessary conditions is always violated; therefore, if an OEV exists, the equilibrium will only have a self-employment sector. In order to simplify the presentation, let \( A = A_1 - A_2 \).

**Proposition 4.** If \( \hat{X} \) represents an OEV and \( A > 0 \) then \( \hat{X} = \{[0,1], \phi, \phi\} \).

The argument of the proof is straightforward. Let \( \hat{w} \) represent the equilibrium wage rate. Since \( A > 0 \) then \( A_1 > A_2 \). If \( \hat{w} \) is such that \( A_1 > \hat{w} > A_2 \), because of Lemmas 2 and 3, \( \Theta_H(\hat{w}) = \phi \) and \( \Theta_W(\hat{w}) = \phi \), then the occupational distribution vector \( \{[0,1], \phi, \phi\} \) is the only OEV. Now, choose an equilibrium wage rate that is higher than \( A_1 \), because of Lemma 2 no one will choose wage employment (i.e., \( \Theta_W = \phi \)); thus, since \( \hat{w} \) is an equilibrium wage rate, it must be the case that \( E_s(\hat{w}) = E_d(\hat{w}) \), therefore \( \Theta_H = \phi \). Finally, if \( \hat{w} \) is lower than \( A_2 \), because of Lemma 3, at equilibrium no one is a HSE therefore \( \Theta_W = \phi \) and \( X = \{[0,1], \phi, \phi\} \) is the only OEV.

Notice that proposition 4 assumed than an OEV exists; however, we can easily establish an existence result:

**Proposition 5.** If \( A > 0 \) then \( \hat{X} = \{[0,1], \phi, \phi\} \) is the unique OEV.

**Proof.** We need to find a wage rate such that \( \hat{X} = \{[0,1], \phi, \phi\} \) is an OEV. Choose \( \hat{w} \) such that \( A_1 > \hat{w} > A_2 \). Since \( A > 0 \), this candidate wage rate exists. Because of Lemmas 2 and 3, \( \Theta_H(\hat{w}) = \phi \) and \( \Theta_W(\hat{w}) = \phi \), thus we have \( E_s(\hat{w}) = E_d(\hat{w}) = 0 \) (i.e., labor market equilibrium). We know that \( \Theta_W \cup \Theta_H = [0,1] \), then at \( \hat{w} \) we have \( \Theta_J(\hat{w}) = [0,1] \) (i.e., occupational choice). This proves that \( \hat{X} = \{[0,1], \phi, \phi\} \) is an OEV, uniqueness is established by proposition 4.

We can also prove that the converse of proposition 5 holds (the proof is left for the appendix). That is,
Proposition 6. If \( \hat{X} = \{[0,1], \phi, \phi\} \) represents an OEV then \( A > 0 \).

The importance of proposition 6 will be highlighted in the following section.

This far, we have established conditions for the existence of one corner equilibrium where all agents choose self-employment and there is no modern sector. Now we study conditions for a different OEV: only wage-employment and entrepreneurial activities.

As before, assume that at a given wage rate \( w^* \) the income as a worker of the less educated agent is equal to the income as a LSE (i.e., \( w^* H(0) = k(1-r) \)). If this is the case, since \( H(\cdot) \) is an increasing function, every agent with a level of human capital higher than 0 will choose to be worker over been a LSE, and at a wage rate higher than \( w^* = k(1-r)/H(0) \) no agent will choose to be a LSE since been a worker provides a higher return. Let \( B_i = k(1-r)/H(0) \), then

\[
\text{Lemma 4. If } \theta_h \text{ is not empty then } w \leq B_i.
\]

Similarly, let \( w^* \) be a wage rate such that the income of the LSE with the lowest schooling level is equal to its income as a HSE (i.e., \( \bar{k}(1-r) = K[H(0)(1-w^*)-r] \)). Solving for \( w^* \) we get

\[
w^* = 1 - \frac{1}{H(0)} \left[ r + \frac{k(1-r)}{k} \right] = B_2.
\]

Therefore, at a wage rate lower than \( B_2 \), no even agent \( i = 0 \) will choose to be a LSE since becoming a HSE provides a higher return. That is,

\[
\text{Lemma 5. If } \theta_h \text{ is not empty then } w \geq B_2.
\]

The previous lemmas represent two necessary conditions for the existence of an OEV that includes a self-employment sector. The following proposition presents conditions under which one of the necessary conditions is always violated; therefore, if an OEV exists, the equilibrium is without a self-employment sector. Let \( B = B_2 - B_1 \), then

\[
\text{Proposition 7. If } \hat{X} \text{ is an OEV and } B > 0 \text{ then } \hat{X} = \{\phi, \phi, \theta_H\}.
\]

The proof follows an argument similar to the one used in proposition 4 (the proof is omitted). Notice that proposition 7 makes no reference to the distribution between workers and high-skill entrepreneurs; in order to do this, we need to know the specific
functional form of \( H(i) \). Therefore, we cannot establish an existence result (as in proposition 5). The following section will address these issues. We know that the converse of proposition 5 holds; however, the converse of proposition 7 is false since we can build an economy where \( \hat{X} = \{\varphi, \theta_w, \theta_H\} \) represents an OEV and \( B < 0 \) (the appendix presents the counterexample).

Now, using propositions 4 and 7, the following corollary establishes necessary conditions for the existence of an inside equilibrium solution:

**Corollary 8.** If \( \hat{X} \) represents an OEV such that \( \theta_n \) are not empty sets for all \( n \in O \), then \( A < 0 \) and \( B < 0 \).

The results obtained this far can be summarize in figure 3. First, notice that \( A > 0 \) can be rearranged as

\[
\frac{K}{1+K} \frac{1}{(1-r)} [H(1) - r] < \frac{1}{k}.
\]

Similarly, arranging terms we can see that \( B > 0 \) implies,

\[
\frac{K}{1+K} \frac{1}{(1-r)} [H(0) - r] > \frac{1}{k}.
\]

Notice that these two last inequalities are basically identical, the only difference being that the first one is in terms of \( H(1) \) while the second one depends on \( H(0) \). Both are drawn in figure 3, where \( \frac{K}{1+K} \) and \( \frac{1}{k} \) were chosen in the axis since they have a linear relationship between them (this simplifies the presentation). Notice that when the exogenous variables \( \frac{K}{1+K} \) and \( \frac{1}{k} \) are in the area where \( A > 0 \), because of proposition 5, there is an OEV without a modern sector. On the other hand, if \( \frac{K}{1+K} \) and \( \frac{1}{k} \) are in the area where \( B > 0 \), and an equilibrium exists, because of proposition 7 we have \( \theta_h = \varphi \) (i.e., no self-employment). These results are very intuitive, if \( \frac{K}{1+K} \) is a big enough, since the income of a LSE is high, all agents will choose this occupation. Similarly, if \( \frac{K}{1+K} \) is big enough, because of high productivity, more agents will choose to be a HSE, increasing the demand for labor, thus the wage rate. Because of this, more agents will leave self-employment and move into wage-employment.
There is an issue in figure 3 that deserves special attention: notice that point \( a \) represents an equilibrium without modern sector, while in point \( b \) there is no self-employment. However, we could prove that point \( a \), because of more resources, represents a higher level of per capita income, even without the presence of a modern sector. In other words, a contraction of the modern sector, together with an expansion of the self-employment sector, does not necessarily mean economic stagnation.

Another issue deserves attention: consider the case when \( H(0) \) is very close \( H(1) \), which means that more years of schooling provides little value added. If this is the case, notice that the slopes for \( A = 0 \) and \( B = 0 \) will become very close. Looking to figure 3, this means that the area between regions \( A > 0 \) and \( B > 0 \) vanishes as \( H(0) \) approaches \( H(1) \). In other words, low value added shrinks the area for interior solutions and small movements in the economy parameters will generate sharp shifts in the occupational composition of the economy. This brings forward an interesting conjecture: does low schooling efficiency explain the sharp movements in and out of self-employment in developing countries?
5. THE H(I) FUNCTION

In order to study more properties of the model, we introduce a specific functional form for \( H(i) \). Assume that \( H : [0,1] \to \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \) has the following linear representation:

\[
H(i) = \alpha + \beta i,
\]

where the lowest level of high skill is \( H(0) = \alpha \) and the highest is \( H(1) = \alpha + \beta \).

Recall from the previous section that \( \sup(\theta_h) = \inf(\theta_w) \). In order to simplify notation, let \( i_{hw} = \sup(\theta_h) = \inf(\theta_w) \). That is, \( i_{hw} \) represents the agent which is indifferent between self-employment and wage employment; therefore, the income from both occupations must be the same (i.e., \( I_w(i_{hw}) = I_h(i_{hw}) \)), then it must be the case that

\[
\bar{k}(1-r) = wH(i_{hw}).
\]

Substitute \( H(i) = \alpha + \beta i \) in the preceding equation. Solving for \( i_{hw} \) we get

\[
i_{hw} = \frac{\bar{k}(1-r)}{w\beta} - \frac{\alpha}{\beta}.
\]

Similarly, we know that \( \sup(\theta_w) = \inf(\theta_h) \); thus, let \( i_{wh} = \sup(\theta_w) = \inf(\theta_h) \).

Therefore, agent \( i_{wh} \) is indifferent between being a worker or a HSE; that is,

\[
\bar{k}[H(i_{wh})(1-w)-r] = wH(i_{wh}).
\]

Substituting \( H(i) \) and solving for \( i_{wh} \) we get

\[
i_{wh} = \frac{r}{\beta(1-w-wK)} - \frac{\alpha}{\beta}.
\]

Now, if \( \theta_h(w) \neq \phi \) and \( \theta_w(w) \neq \phi \), we can specify the demand and supply for labor where at equilibrium,

\[
\bar{K} \int_{i_{wh}}^{i_{hw}} H(i)di = \int_{i_{wh}}^{i_{hw}} H(i)di.
\]

\(^9\) All results from this section also hold for a logarithmic or an exponential function.
After evaluating the integral for \( H(i) = \alpha + \beta i \) and substituting the values for \( i_{hW} \) and \( i_{H\alpha} \), it is not possible to find a close form solution for the equilibrium wage rate, therefore the following section presents some numerical simulations.

5.1. Numerical Simulations

The exogenous parameters of the model are \( \xi = (r, k, K, \alpha, \beta) \). The first three numerical simulations will study the behavior of the percentage of the population in self employment when the borrowings constraints and the interest rate change. In what follows, let \( h \) represent the percentage of the population in self-employment where, since all agents belong to the \([0,1]\) interval, we know that \( h = \sup(\theta_h) = i_{hw} \).

5.2. Borrowing Constraint Changes

An increase in the values of \( k \) and \( K \) represent a relaxation of the borrowing constraints for the LS and HS entrepreneurs. In order to explain the way in which the levels of \( k \) and \( K \) are chosen, we can use the following story: firms with administrators can get bigger maximum loans than firms without administrators, or alternatively, firms that hire high-skill workers get big loans, while only small loans are available to self-employment firms\(^{10}\).

Figure 4 presents a numerical simulation for \((\alpha, \beta, r) = (1, 1, 1/3)\), where \( K \) is in the \( x \) axis and \( h \) — the percentage of self-employment — in the \( y \) axis. This figure presents three curves: the furthermost to the left is drawn using \( k = 3/5 \), while \( k = 1 \) rests in the middle and when \( k = 5/3 \) the curve is drawn to the right. Notice that a relaxation of the borrowing constraint \( k \) increases self-employment while an increase in \( K \) reduces it. The intuition is straight forward: relaxing the \( k \) constraint, increases income for agents in self-employment and agents move into this sector; on the other hand, an increase in \( K \), generates a higher demand for HS labor, thus the equilibrium wage rate increases and self-employment will decrease. Notice that with \( k = 3/5 \) (i.e., the tightest constraint), the relative size of self-employment is very sensitive to changes in \( K \). Therefore, an interesting question arises: could sharp fluctuations on the size of self-employment, characteristic of developing countries, be explained by very tight borrowing constraints on the loans market for LSE?

\(^{10}\) On an effort to endogenize the borrowing constraint, we could build a loan function that depends on the schooling level.
It is important to make a final methodological remark. In figure 4, the computational program used for the numerical simulation did not draw the kink of the curve at \( h = 1 \), this instruction was introduced to run the simulation. Nevertheless, on a different numerical simulation (not shown), we found that when the value of \( h \) approaches the value of one we have \( A < 0 \) and approaches the value of zero. Furthermore, when the value of \( h \) is higher than one, the simulation shows that \( A > 0 \). Therefore, because of proposition 5, we know that a unique OEV exist with \( h = 1 \).

5.2.1. Changes in the Interest Rate

The analysis of the consequences of a change in \( r \) it is not straightforward. First of all, a raise in \( r \) produces two opposing forces. A decrease in the interest rate increases profits of the HSE, thus increasing the demand for labor and the wage rate, thus reducing the incentives toward self-employment. However, in the other hand, the decrease in \( r \) raises the LSE income, thus improving the incentives to join this sector. Because of this, when \( r \) changes, for different values of \( \xi \), we could get a positive or a negative change in \( h \). Nevertheless, to look into the value of \( A \) (i.e., the condition for a corner solution) is an alternative approach in order to look for the set of parameters for which we could expect a positive or negative impact. First of all, taking the first derivative of \( A \) (recall that \( A = A_1 - A_2 \)) with respect to \( r \) we get,

\[
A' = \frac{1}{H(1)} \left( \frac{K}{1+K} - \bar{k} \right),
\]
where the sign of the derivative depends on the value of \( \bar{K}(1+\bar{K})-\bar{k} \). The following numerical simulation supports our guess.

**Figure 5.** \( h, \ A \) vs. \( r \) with \( \bar{K}=50 \) and \( \bar{k}=3/2 \)

Two curves are drawn in figures 5 and 6, the thicker one represents \( h \) while the other one represents the value of \( A \). In figure 5, when \( A \) remains positive we have
$h = 1$ and when $A$ is negative (and decreases) the value of $h$ starts to decrease. In this figure, $\bar{K} = 50$ and $\bar{K} = 3/2$ therefore $A_r < 0$. On the other hand, in figure 6, where $\bar{K} = 4$, $h$ increases together with $r$. As before, we can see that for this set of parameters $A_r > 0$. The economic intuition of these results suggests that if $\bar{K}$ is large enough, an increase in the interest rate, because of higher costs, provides strong incentives to leave the self-employment sector. On the other hand, if $\bar{K}$ is small enough, the increase in costs for the LSE will be small compared to the decrease in wages result of a lower demand for HS workers, thus some agents will move from wage-employment to self-employment.

Though it is not shown in both figures, as a result of a lower interest rate, the average income per capita of the economy increases in both cases. Nevertheless, as we have seen, depending on the parameters of the model, the LSE sector could expand or contract. That is, this exercise provides conditions under which, given a change in $r$, the self-employment sector behaves on a cyclical or countercyclical form.

5.2.2. Changes on Educational Efficiency

This section studies changes on the function that transforms schooling into high skill productivity. This far, we have assumed that $H(i) = \alpha + \beta i$, thus an increase in $\beta$ symbolizes an overall increase in high skill productivity. Therefore, we can expect an increase in the number of HSE and an increase in wages, thus an incentive to leave self-employment.

Figure 7 presents the results for changes in $\beta$ and its impact on the proportion of agents in self-employment. The simulation was done with $(\alpha, \bar{K}, r) = (1, 5, 3/2)$. Again, three curves are presented: the one to the left is drawn with a value of $\bar{K} = 3/2$, while the one further to the right uses a $\bar{K} = 4$ value. As expected, we see a drop in the number of LSE. Again, notice that, for low values of $\bar{K}$ and $\beta$, the proportion of agents in self-employment is very sensitive to changes in $\beta$.

---

11 Our measure of per capita income (net of cost of capital) is:

$$k(1-r)i_{HS} + K\int_{\text{seg}} H(i) di - Kr(1-i_{HS}).$$

12 We omit the low skill case since an increase in low skill productivity, because of the binding borrowing constraint, has no impact on the equilibrium values of the economy. Since all agents are indexed in the interval $[0,1]$, that represents schooling level, we could change the maximum years of schooling by indexing agents in the $[0,s]$ interval, where an increase in $s$ represents an increase in the years of schooling of the most educated agent. This section will follow a different exercise: changes in the educational efficiency (i.e., the $H(i)$ function) which represents how schooling transfers into productive skills.

13 We omit the exercise of an increasing $\alpha$ since the results are similar.
5.2.3. The Average Size of Business Firms

This far we have focused our analysis on changes in $h$. Nevertheless, as in Lucas (1978), we can also study the average size of business firms (ASBF). Figure 8 presents the changes in the proportion of the population who chooses to be a HSE when there is an increase in $K$. Again, three curves are drawn for $\beta = (1,1.5,2)$, where a higher $\beta$ shifts the curve upwards thus increasing the number of HSE.

Notice that the number of HSE, after an initial increase, decreases as the value of $K$ increases, as a matter of fact, the three functions converge to zero as $K$ approaches infinity. The result is not surprising, since bigger firms increase their demand for labor (thus raising wages), therefore agents shift from HSE to wage employment. However, the following result might be a little surprising.
Figure 9 presents the average size of business firms (i.e., the number of workers divided by the amount of HSE) drawn against $K$. Again, three curves are drawn for $\beta = (1,1.5,2)$, where a rise in $\beta$ shifts the curve upwards. First, notice that the ASBF increases as $K$ increases, probably not very surprising since the proportion of HSE converges to zero as $K$ increases. What might be a little surprising is the impact on the
ASBF when $\beta$ raises. First, as we mentioned before, the number of HSE increases when the schooling efficiency is higher, therefore we might expect a decrease in the ASBF; however, the ASBF increases. The intuition for this result can be drawn from the previous section, where an increase in $\beta$ reduces the number of agents in self-employment, therefore when $\beta$ increases we have more HSE but also more workers, therefore the ASBF increases.

Wrapping up, we proved that high borrowing constraints in the modern sector of the economy and low schooling efficiency (both very common in less developed economies) causes a small size of business firms.

5.2.4. Distribution of Schooling Resources

This section introduces a different $H(i)$ distribution for the transfer of schooling into high skill productivity. This will allow us to study some public policy choices. Assume that a policy maker has the possibility of shifting resources in order to increase efficiency in the later years of schooling. For example, we could reduce resources in elementary and secondary while increasing them in higher education.

Figure 10. Two $H(i)$ Distributions

Figure 10 presents this policy alternative: we select the parameters for both distributions in such a way that the area under the curve is the same for both distributions, thus the total amount of value added remains the unchanged. In this figure, the $\alpha_2 + \beta_2(i)$ distribution generates higher returns on the later years of education,
while punishing the returns from early schooling. We choose \((\alpha, \beta) = (1, 1)\) for the first distribution and \((\alpha, \beta) = (0, 3)\) for the second one. We easily see that the area under the curve is the same one for both distributions. The results for the numerical simulations are shown in figures 11 and 12, where the policy shift is represented by the thicker graph.

Figure 11. \(h\) vs. \(K\) for \((\alpha, \beta) = (1, 1)\) and \((\alpha, \beta) = (0, 3)\)

Figure 12. Per Capita Income vs. \(\bar{K}\) for \((\alpha, \beta) = (1, 1)\) and \((\alpha, \beta) = (0, 3)\)

Figure 11 shows that, for low levels of \(\bar{K}\), the number of LSE decreases. However, for high levels of \(\bar{K}\) the result is reversed. The initial decrease is not difficult to see
since, with higher efficiency for the HSE, the demand for labor increases together with
the equilibrium wage rate, thus driving down the number of agents in self-employment.
On the other hand, we know that \( h \) decreases when \( \bar{K} \) increases; however, the policy
shift makes \( H(0) = 0 \), meaning that it is harder to reduce self-employment since the
income from wage-employment has decreased substantially for low levels of schooling.

An interesting result is depicted in figure 12, where the numerical simulation shows
how the per capita income has increased with the new policy. The intuition is
straightforward: the new distribution frees resources from low levels of schooling, which
are idle since people with low schooling will join self-employment anyway. This idle
resources increases productivity of HSE, thus profits increase together with salaries.
Also, agents that switch from LSE to wage employment will improve their welfare level.
To reduce instead the resources into higher education, since you are educating low skill
agents that will not use their new learn skills, will produce more self-employment and
lower per capita income. Notice that this exercise does not take into account the dynamic
aspects of the policy. More precisely, increasing resources in early schooling might
increase the learning capacities of agents at later years; that is, the \( H(i) \) curve could
experience a upward shift on the long run. Our model cannot capture the dynamic
aspects from this policy change.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS

We studied some development issues and the conditions under which the
self-employment sector behaves on a cyclical or countercyclical form. Also, since this
paper is centered on human capital differen ces, we paid special attention to the success
or failure of schooling efficiency. Nonetheless, some extensions can be made in order to
study alternative policy issues. Among them:

• Minimum wage considerations could be introduced in order to study welfare
  considerations.
• As we mentioned in section 2, agents do not have the choice of voluntary
  unemployment. Extensions can be introduced in order to study unemployment
  compensation policies.
• Recall that the parameters \( \bar{k} \) and \( \bar{K} \) are exogenous to the model. An
  interesting extension could be to introduce an endogenous borrowing constraint. A
  possibility is to attach borrowing constraints to educational attainment, this way the
  model could produce a new sector of LSE that hires workers and is richer than wage
  earners (but poorer than HSE). That is, we could build a model as in Banerjee and
  Newman (1993) and Antunes and Cavalcanti (2002), but without ruling out the presence
  of LSE that chooses self-employment activities and is poorer than agents in
  wage-employment. This way the model could produce a richer set of occupational
choices.

- A consequence of adopting a uniform distribution where agents belong to the closed interval \([0,1]\), as we did in this paper, is that there are no two agents with the same schooling level, which is highly unrealistic. A follow up to this model could consist in adopting more realistic schooling distributions.

- Welfare considerations were not tackled in depth in this paper. However, the task could be interesting and challenging. For example, an interesting issue is the choice of an appropriate welfare measure. One candidate could be the average income of each sector of the economy. However, this measure could be misleading. For example, a policy that reduces the income of the HSE will bring about a movement from HSE to wage earners but, since the poorer HSE will leave this sector, it could be that the per capita income of the sector increases, signaling incorrectly that the welfare of this sector has improved.

While it is not difficult to introduce and study these extensions, we decided not to deviate from the original objectives: a) to show that traditional models on occupational choice are not the best way to describe some facts from some developing economies, and b) to build a model that rationalizes observations from these economies.

Appendix

Lemma 1. The sets \( \theta_i \) are convex. a) Convexity of \( \theta_h \). We want to prove that if \( i \in \theta_h(w) \) and \( i' \in \theta_h(w) \), then \( i'' \in \theta_h(w) \), where \( i'' = \alpha i + (1-\alpha) i' \) and \( \alpha \in [0,1] \). Assume that \( i < i' \). Since \( i' \in \theta_h(w) \) we know that \( \bar{k}(1-r) > wH(i') \). Now, since \( i'' \geq i' \) and \( H() \) is increasing in \( i \), then \( wH(i'') \geq wH(i') \), so \( \bar{k}(1-r) > wH(i'') \). It is left to prove that \( \bar{k}(1-r) > I_H(i'') = K[(1-w)H(i'')-r] \). Again, since \( i < i' < \theta_h(w) \), we know that \( \bar{k}(1-r) > I_H(i) \) and \( \bar{k}(1-r) > I_H(i') \). If \( (1-w) > 0 \) then \( I_H() \) is increasing in \( i \) and \( \bar{k}(1-r) > I_H(i') \). If it is the case that \( (1-w) \leq 0 \) then \( I_H() \) is not increasing in \( i \) and \( \bar{k}(1-r) > I_H(i) \). A similar argument holds for b) convexity of \( \theta_w \) and c) convexity of \( \theta_H \).

Proposition 1. i) if \( i \in \theta_h \) and \( i'' \in \theta_w \) then \( i \leq i'' \) and ii) \( i \in \theta_w \) and \( i'' \in \theta_H \) then \( i \leq i'' \). i) Since \( i \in \theta_h(w) \) then \( \bar{k}(1-r) > wH(i) \). Also, since \( i'' \in \theta_w(w) \), then \( wH(i'') > \bar{k}(1-r) \) therefore \( H(i'') > H(i) \). We know that \( H(i) \) is an increasing
function, therefore \( i' > i \). ii) Since \( i \in \theta_w(w) \), then \( wH(i) > \mathcal{K}[(1-w)H(i) - r] \).

Rearranging terms we get \( r > H(i)[(1-w) - (w/\mathcal{K})] \). Also, since \( i' \in \theta_H(w) \), it must be the case that \( \mathcal{K}[(1-w)H(i') - r] < wH(i') \). Rearranging terms we get \( H(i')[(1-w) - (w/\mathcal{K})] > r \) therefore \( H(i') > H(i) \). Thus, since \( H(i) \) is an increasing function, we have \( i' > i \).

**Proposition 2.** i) if \( i \in \theta_h \) and \( i' \in \theta_w \) then \( I_h(i) \leq I_w(i') \) and ii) if \( i \in \theta_w \) and \( i' \in \theta_H \) then \( I_w(i) \leq I_H(i') \). i) By definition we know that \( I_h(i) = \mathcal{K}(1-r) \) and that \( I_w(i') = wH(i) \), since \( i' \in \theta_H(w) \) it must be the case that \( wH(i') > \mathcal{K}(1-r) \), therefore \( I_w(i') > I_h(i) \). ii) By definition we know that \( I_w(i) = wH(i) \) and that \( I_H(i') = \mathcal{K}[(1-w)H(i') - r] \). Since \( i' \in \theta_H(w) \) it must be the case that \( \mathcal{K}[(1-w)H(i') - r] > wH(i') \). From proposition 1 we know that if \( i \in \theta_w(w) \) and \( i' \in \theta_H(w) \) then \( i > i' \). We know that \( H(i) \) is an increasing function and \( i' > i \), then \( H(i') > H(i) \), therefore \( \mathcal{K}[(1-w)H(i') - r] > wH(i') > wH(i) \) which proves that \( I_H(i') > I_w(i) \).

**Proposition 3.** If \( \theta_h(w) \) are not empty sets then: i) \( \inf(\theta_h) = 0 \), ii) \( \sup(\theta_H) = 1 \), iii) \( \sup(\theta_h) = \inf(\theta_w) \) and iv) \( \sup(\theta_H) = \inf(\theta_H) \). i) Let \( i' = \inf(\theta_h(w)) \). Assume that \( i' \neq 0 \), then \( 0 \notin \theta_h(w) \) and either \( 0 \in \theta_w(w) \) or \( 0 \in \theta_H(w) \). If \( 0 \in \theta_w(w) \) then it exists an \( i'' = 0 \) such that \( i'' > i' \). This contradicts proposition 2 where if \( i'' \in \theta_H(w) \) then \( i'' > i \) for all \( i \in \theta_h(w) \). We build the same argument for the \( 0 \in \theta_H(w) \) case. ii) Let \( i = \sup(\theta_H(w)) \). Assume that \( i' \neq 1 \), then \( 1 \notin \theta_H(w) \) and either \( 1 \in \theta_w(w) \) or \( 1 \in \theta_h(w) \). If \( 1 \in \theta_w(w) \) then it exists an \( i'' = 1 \) such that \( i'' > i' \). This contradicts proposition 2 where if \( i'' \in \theta_H(w) \) then \( i'' < i \) for all \( i \in \theta_H(w) \). We build the same argument for the case where \( 1 \in \theta_h(w) \). iii) Assume that \( \sup(\theta_h(w)) = \inf(\theta_w(w)) \). Let \( i' = \inf(\theta_h(w)) \) and \( i'' = \sup(\theta_w(w)) \). If \( i'' > i'' \) then there exist \( i' \in \theta_h(w) \) and \( i'' \in \theta_w(w) \) such that \( i'' > i' \). This contradicts proposition 2 where if \( i'' \in \theta_H(w) \) then \( i'' > i \) for all \( i \in \theta_h(w) \). Now, if \( \sup(\theta_h(w)) < \inf(\theta_w(w)) \) then it must exist an \( i'' \in \theta_H(w) \) such that \( \sup(\theta_h(w)) < i'' < \inf(\theta_w(w)) \). Recall that \( 1 \in \theta_H(w) \) therefore \( i'' < \inf(\theta_w(w)) \leq 1 \), but since \( i'' \in \theta_H(w) \), this violates the convexity of \( \theta_H(w) \) from proposition 1. iv) Assume that \( \sup(\theta_w(w)) \neq \inf(\theta_H(w)) \). Let \( i' = \sup(\theta_H(w)) \) and \( i'' = \inf(\theta_H(w)) \). If \( i'' > i'' \) then there exist \( i' \in \theta_w(w) \) and \( i'' \in \theta_H(w) \) such that \( i'' > i' \). This contradicts
proposition 2 where if \( i^* \in \theta_H(w) \) then \( i^* > i \) for all \( i \in \theta_H(w) \). Now if \( \sup(\theta_H(w)) < \inf(\theta_H(w)) \) then it must exist an \( i^* \in \theta_h(w) \) such that \( \sup(\theta_H(w)) < i^* < \inf(\theta_H(w)) \). Recall that \( 0 \in \theta_H(w) \) therefore \( 0 \leq \sup(\theta_H(w)) < i^* \), but since \( i^* \in \theta_h(w) \), this violates the convexity of \( \theta_h(w) \) from proposition 1.

**Proposition 6.** If \( \hat{X} = \{0,1\} \) represents an OEV then \( A > 0 \). Let \( w^* \) represent the equilibrium wage rate. Since \( \theta_H \) are \( \theta_H \) empty sets, it must be the case that for all agents:

\[
\overline{K}[H(i)(1-w^*)-r]<\overline{k}(1-r) \text{ and } w^*H(i)<\overline{k}(1-r).
\]

Evaluating for \( i = 1 \) and solving the two inequalities in terms of \( w^* \) delivers:

\[
1 - \frac{r}{H(1)} - \frac{\overline{k}(1-r)}{KH(1)} < w^* < \frac{\overline{k}(1-r)}{H(1)}.
\]

Rearranging terms we get:

\[
H(1) - r < \overline{k}(1-r) \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{\overline{K}} \right].
\]

Again, rearranging terms we get:

\[
\frac{\overline{K}}{1+\overline{K}} \left[ 1 - \frac{r}{H(1)} \right] < \frac{\overline{k}(1-r)}{H(1)}.
\]

That is, \( A > 0 \).

**The Counterexample for the converse of Proposition 7.** We are looking for a set of parameters such that \( \hat{X} = \{\phi,\theta_H,\theta_H\} \) represents an OEV and \( B < 0 \). Let \( H(i) = \alpha + \beta i \). Also, choose \( (r,\alpha,\beta,\overline{K}) = (1/3,1,5,1) \). Using this parameters, it is the case that \( B < 0 \). We have left to prove that there is an OEV with no self-employment for this set of parameters. Choose \( w^* = .68 \) as candidate for equilibrium wage. We can see that \( \overline{k}(1-r) < w^*H(0) \), which means that the agent with the lowest schooling level is better off in wage employment than in self-employment, therefore no agent will choose at \( w^* \) self-employment as an occupation. We can also prove that for \( w^* = .68 \) labor supply equals demand for labor; therefore,
\( \hat{X} = \{ \phi, \theta_w, \theta_H \} \) is an OEV for this economy.

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